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ABSTRACT 
 
My contribution is a review of the Proceedings of the V Meeting of Italian-American Phi-
losophy Autonomy of Reason? Autonomie der Vernunft? (Riccardo Dottori ed., Yearbook of 
Philosophical Hermeneutics I/2009, Lit Verlag, Münster) that toke place in Rome (October 
2007). American and European philosophers established a fruitful dialog aiming to show 
the complexity of the notion of “Reason” and, in particular, the possibility of its “Auton-
omy”. As we will see in the following discussion, human reason seems to be characterized by 
somewhat vague borders. 
 
 
The V Meeting of Italian-American Philosophy is not a specific debate on 
“autonomy” as in contemporary theories of autonomy; it is rather a fruitful 
confrontation on some relevant philosophical issues that arise when we reflect 
on the relationship between judgment and desires, emotions, preferences and 
values. Interesting cues come from different areas: aesthetics, hermeneutics, 
logic and science, social science, ethics and politics.  
Let’s follow this order of discussion. Ivan Soll raises doubts about the “su-
periority of aesthetically disengaged experience’ and establishes a fruitful con-
nection between pragmatic and cognitive aspects of consciousness. Moreover 
he argues for the selective task of the aesthetic experience. There is more than 
one way to visually contemplate the same object aesthetically: one can con-
centrate on the quality and play of its colors, or focus upon its structure, or its 
representative content, or its psychological expressiveness. It is not a matter 
of a “pragmatic” consciousness” but it is how the life of desire and action 
works as experience one has while engaged in action and driven by desire. 
Piero Montani proposes to reconcile reason and sensibility by following 
Schiller and some bioaesthetical issues. The interesting question is the expres-
sive power of the technical projection of sensibility in contemporary art that is 
anchored in a bioaesthetical context and possesses an “emancipatory” poten-
tial. The Frankfurt’s school already presented a view on this power but a lucid 
glance back to Schiller reveals the reciprocal game of reason and sensibility in 
different forms of arts beyond the superiority of a single form of expression as, 
for instance, music. One good example is the proposal of Susan L. Feagin who 
considers the rationality of emphathizing with fictional characters. The inter-
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esting point is that she challenges the opposition between rational and non ra-
tional ability to empathize which respectively correspond to interpersonal re-
lationship and literature. In particular, the difficulties of simulating the men-
tal processes of actual persons and hence of emphasizing with them do not en-
tail that it will be equally difficult to simulate and emphathize when reading 
fiction; skilled authors may write in ways that facilitate simulation and empa-
thy on the part of appropriately sensitive readers. Luigi Lombardi Vallauri es-
tablishes a fruitful comparison between juridical and aesthetic judgments in 
order to show the “cognitive” aspect of emotions in the latter. It is clear that 
juridical judgment entails a sort of detachment from emotions because of its 
conformity to norms. The central point of Vallauri’s paper is how to avoid a 
sort of “rule following’ in the aesthetic field where there is a strong tendency 
to conform to academic “metaaestethical” norms. Another interesting and 
plausible point is the “intersubjective” character of aesthetic judgment that 
manifests itself in the phenomenon of “deixis”: even though the individual is 
ultimately ungraspable “we” have the possibility to “approve” and “disap-
prove” the emotions it provoke us.   
Robert Pippin’s paper aims to defend the Hegelian notion of “the absolute 
idea” namely of conceptuality itself. He argues against those who think that 
an independent category theory or that a doctrine of self-moving conceptual 
or actually noetic structure underlying the apparent world, constitutes the ba-
sic Hegelian position as the Spirit’s self-knowledge is an externalization that 
manifests itself in the history of art, religion, politics and world history.  Plau-
sibly, he rejects contemporary attempts to “logicize” the Hegelian Phenome-
nology. Gianni Vattimo follows Pippin indication to read Hegel in the right 
sense as the Hermeneutic tradition seems to have done. Vattimo analyzes 
some relativist results such as the theory of truth presented by Richard Rorty. 
The core of his contribution is the warning not to confuse some Anglo-Saxon 
interpretations of Hegel with the hermeneutic approach of Gadamer whose 
philosophy cannot be considered as relativistic. Contrary to Pippin, Therry 
Pinkard presents a critical paper on the Hegelian “monism of reason” that 
represents the culminating point of the phenomenology. He embraces the in-
terpretation provided by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and can be summarized in the 
idea that the order of the logic of our thoughts meshes with the order of the 
universe in that we are giving shape and expression to the rational logos that is 
at work in everything. Roberta De Monticelli presents a very interesting con-
tribution on the “emergency” of a person through a hierarchy of acts. Her 
primary reference is Husserl and the notion of “positionality” that expresses 
itself in first level positions such as perceptions and emotions. They are not 
free because they depend on their positionality namely neither on the free sub-
ject nor on the external world. According to De Monticelli, by free acts in a 
strict sense, or self-constitutive acts, a personal identity through time emerges, 
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with actual responsibility of one’s past and present self. This thesis means that 
consciousness and self-consciousness presuppose subjectivity as capacity for 
acts namely acquiring a linguistically and conceptually articulated first person 
perspective. I think that De Monticelli presents a highly idealized model of 
identity that does not consider the nature we share with animals and moreover 
the difficulty for marginalized people, cultural minorities and women them-
selves to realize their personality because of cultural and social obstacles. A lot 
of authors working in the field of logics maintain that it is fundamental to give 
a response to the question “is it possible to explain why norms or reasons are 
correct?’  It is indeed an original and maybe plausible answer the one given by 
Paul Horwich who thinks that actually we do not need to provide a philoso-
phical solution. Obviously philosophers presented several interesting solutions 
and Horwich critically considers four attempts to ground our norms of rational 
belief. The first is the semantogenetic that finds normativity in the meanings of 
word. The second invokes “rational intuitions”  that require a special form of 
experience different from immediate experience. The third is reliabilism ac-
cording to which a true belief is a worthwhile end justifying an epistemic pro-
cedure. The fourth is a form of constructivism such as that Horwich sees in Bob 
Brandom’s account. This is that the facts of epistemic normativity are 
grounded in our epistemical practice namely in the norms we take to be correct. 
Horwich maintains that these solutions are not adequate to fund our norms of 
justification but he does not fall in relativism or skepticism. Rather he thinks 
that a certain belief-forming procedure itemizes the rational one and probably 
the explanation of the nature of procedure will be provided by naturalistic ac-
counts (neurological or evolutionary or social). Against this result Franca 
D’Agostino argues for what she calls anomalous foundationalism, which seems 
to be the most large shared picture of reason. It consists in saying that there 
are various inverted pyramids (which is how d’Agostino interprets the Carte-
sian Strategy namely as an inverted pyramid) and they all move, change in 
time. The fine paper of Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Giuliano Toraldo Di Francia 
ed Eleonora Negri poses interesting questions concerning the relationship be-
tween logic and music:  is it possible to represent a musical score as a peculiar 
example of a formal language? In a sense, are scores formalizable? According to 
the authors, one can positively answer to this question, by introducing the no-
tion of formal representation of a musical score, as we can identify some classes 
of symbolic expressions that play a fundamental role. One of the most impor-
tant point of discussion in analytic philosophy concerns the interpretation of 
the notions of  “thought” and “judgment” by Frege. Carlo Penco concentrates 
on the tension between “cognitive” and “semantic” sense that are present in 
several passages of Frege’s work and concludes that there are some disadvan-
tages in recent attempts to recover Frege’s duality of senses. Penco individu-
ates some interesting points to be followed by contemporary logic: (1) distin-
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guishing different procedures depending on the needs and goals of speakers; (2) 
enlarging the scope of logic from representing mathematical reasoning to also 
representing commonsense reasoning; (3) giving space to the cognitive differ-
ences of expressions without falling into psychologism and (4) taking care of 
the role of context of utterance .Starting from the difference  driven by pierce 
between different methods of “fixating our beliefs”. Mauro Dorato offers a 
way to make the “method of tenacity” and the “method of science” compati-
ble; they characterize respectively pragmatism and naturalism. Dorato pre-
sents the reasons normally taken to show that they are incompatible; these 
very reasons support rather their complementarity both within science and 
decision-making. 
John McDowell presents an original interpretation of the Kantian notion 
of freedom and establishes a mediation between it and some Hegelian issues in 
order to consider the fact that we live in a real community. According to 
McDowell, we must avoid two tendencies. The first is the tendency to abandon 
the idea that there is something like that of doing the right things. We cannot 
but supposing that there exist right and wrong answers to the question of 
what we ought to think or to do. The second is the tendency to fall in the 
Myth of the Given as Sellars called it. Mc Dowell describes this myth as the 
idea that things are available to us in a simple passive way as a transaction 
that does not require from the part of the subject the capacity to actively take 
responsibility for his/her claims and actions. This result seems to rule out the 
very possibility of individual reflection that rather is a fundamental condition 
to reach the end of consent between individual and community. McDowell 
proposal gives rise to several problems. As the comment of Giovanni Iorio 
Giannoli shows, if we establish a strong connection between individual and  
community by emphasizing the role of the consent we run the risk to fall in 
homologation. Moreover, we cannot grasp the real dynamic between cognitive 
individual systems with their particular abilities, beliefs and desires and the 
collective systems with their own properties and general characteristics and 
structures. Robert Brandom tries to reconcile Kant and Hegel by establishing 
a deep relation between attitude dependence and content dependence. He 
privileges the latter because the objectivity of the content of reasons can be 
publicly recognized in virtue of its material-inferential articulation. This move 
implies to collapse freedom into autonomy as agents are autonomous just be-
cause they bind their reasoning to shared commitments namely commitments 
publicly recognized and approved by their community. In this context, I think 
that the criticism of Eva Picardi to the Brandom’s paper is illuminating. She 
underscores a certain obscurity as regards (1) the individualism of meaning 
and (2) the distinction between public and shared. The first issue comes from 
Davidson and Dummett but Dummett has the advantage to maintain that the 
speaker hold him/herelf as responsible for the meaning he/she attributes to 
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his/her expressions as a member of a linguistic community. It is indeed a merit 
of Brandom to insist on the circumstances (Sellars) and the consequences of 
the application of concepts. Picardi thinks however that we can rely to a more 
plausible account of the practices “we share”; Wittegenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations present a valid example of the connection between words and 
acts. According to Diego Marconi, Brandom’s model is exposed to objections 
because it aims to be a plausible view on recognition based on a kind of “lin-
guistic normativity”. But, Hegel himself intended recognition as recognition 
among persons who recognize the others and themselves as “imputable”. Mar-
coni challenges the way in which Brandom intends normativity as a bound to 
a linguistic competence that seems to be apanage of experts. Indeed we cannot 
rule out the authority of experts but we have to admit a third player of the 
game of giving and acting for reasons namely nature. To move in a “social” 
space of reasons could imply to conceive freedom in a normative sense as it is 
grounded on shareable social norms i.e. to make a bootstrapping from individ-
ual to sociality as James Swindler suggests in his fine paper. By demonstrating 
the ultimate transcendental linguistic game on which freedom is essentially re-
lated Swindler recalls the elenctic strategy adopted by Karl Otto Apel. How-
ever, he points on the social notion of “imputability” which takes its sense 
from the fact that we can rely on a normative background as a conceptual 
background that recalls the Fregean “platonic given”. In my brief comment I 
share the normative nature of freedom but, like Brandom, Swindler proposes a 
kind of “positive freedom” that in my opinion does not give the right weight 
to the attitudes of the speakers through which they take position in the discur-
sive game of giving and asking for reasons. 
Warren Reich offers a lucid and shareable discussion about the notion of 
“laicality” and the sense we have to assign to the “secular society”. After a 
brilliant historical-conceptual reconstruction of the real sense of the word 
‘secularization” and its influences on bioethics Reich focuses on some ideas of 
Stout who does not want to consider the religious ethics as an “Outsider”. He 
embraces the Fornero’s meaning of “laicality” that is compatible with a mean-
ing of secular society as a “non-exclusionist” arena. Laicality entails the prin-
ciple of reciprocal autonomy for if religious presentors expect respect for plu-
ralism, liberty and tolerance they should present their information by appeal-
ing to liberty, tolerance and respect for pluralism. The relationship between 
moral and right is crucial not only in the public/political field but also in the 
personal field of bioethics. Stefano Semplici maintains that bioethical choices 
such us euthanasia and abortion are not only a private affair. It is however 
difficult to regulate them entirely from a legal point of view because of the 
moral dilemmas we meet in the peculiar dramatic situation as the movie of 
Clint Eastwood Million dollar baby shows in a lucid way. Another important 
philosophical issue is the nature for the mental contents of animals namely if 
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they have beliefs. Simone Gozzano introduces and criticizes the arguments 
against animal beliefs and presents some general conditions for the attribution 
of intentional states to animals. He provides a distinction of three kinds of 
mental contents we share we animals: (1) the content related to instinctive and 
autonomic reactions such as reflexes; (2) the content associated with some rep-
resentational capacities which are not fully epistemic but deserve to change a 
the structure of the system by providing more or new information and (3) the 
content that allows for opaque readings and their correct individuation which 
establishes an epistemic relation to truth conditions. That is because according 
to Gozzano we cannot infer from John’s belief that Cicero denounced Catiline 
that Tully denounced Catiline because John  may not have the information. 
My question to Gozzano is about the necessity of posing truth condition at 
that level for animals. On the one side it is true that we have ordinary lan-
guage to perform substitutinal moves. On the other side animals have their 
very sophisticated way of communicating about state in the world. Communi-
cation is the basic phenomenon common to animals and humans and we are 
lucky that sometimes and somehow we can communicate with animals. Urban 
Wiesling establishes a fruitful connection between the Kantian judgment as 
presented in the third Critic and medicine. As many authors think nowadays 
philosophy must reflect from concrete situations where individual choices take 
place and the requirement of the evidence of results plays an important role in 
the affair. 
The last session is dedicated to politics; the contributions are mainly fo-
cused on the problem of justice. David Rasmussen introduces the important 
topic of global justice. Starting from the Kantian inheritance in the thought of 
John Rawls and Thomas Nagel, he argues for a form of cosmopolitanism that 
can do two things that the critique of global justice says it cannot, namely, ac-
commodate pluralism and achieve sovereignty as an enabling condition on a 
global level. Rasmussen considers the paradox of global justice as the tension 
between the need to preserve the uniqueness of domestic institutions and the 
need to apply principles of law and justice with a sufficient force so that stan-
dards of fairness and equality are met on the international level.    Cosmopol-
itanism is mostly based on the Kantian theory of human rights but there are 
several philosophical distinctions to be underscored inside it.  Luigi Caranti 
clarifies the difference between freedom and autonomy and argues for a plau-
sible conception of autonomy as a condition of possibility of all possible val-
ues. This move implies that even for instance religious loyalty or attachment 
to group traditions and the like have some significance if and only if are en-
dorsed by free, autonomous individuals. In this sense there is genuine attach-
ment to a tradition, even the most illiberal, that is not the result of the indi-
vidual’s autonomous decision. Caranti aims to propose to combine the logical 
dependence of all values from autonomy with the notion of respect to obtain a 
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powerful foundation of human rights capable to cut across the moral plurality 
of our world. Contrary to the cosmopolitan view of Caranti, Rudiger Bittner 
discusses the problem of nomativity and plausibly maintains that the kind of 
normativity we must look for is not prescriptive but is the normativity of rea-
son itself. It is controversial whether or not there are things such as moral 
norms. According to Bittner our experience is that of things we did or intend 
to do having various qualities which earn them moral and other recommenda-
tion or the opposite. We thus recognize these qualities by virtue of reason as 
we can give reasons for what we say and we can improve our judgments 
thanks to reasons we are given by others. The most fundamental question in 
politics is how to favor justice in a multicultural world. Some philosophers 
think that we can find conditions for implement justice though a sort of 
“communicative rationality”. Stefano Petrucciani discusses the approaches of 
Karl Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas; moreover he aims at demonstrating the 
validity of the Apelian position using some ideas from Wolfgang Kuhlmann. 
According to Petrucciani, a strong distinction between norms of argumenta-
tion and norms of justice is not plausible for the simple reason that it is inco-
herent to assume that a person can be divided into a part to which we own re-
spect as participants to the argumentation and a part to which we do not own 
because of the particular interests, needs and validity claims. Petrucciani 
maintains that Habermas rests on a sort of skepticism about justice but I 
think that Habermas presents a powerful distinction between communicative 
action and reflexive communicative action that takes into consideration the 
potentialities of individual expression of his/her voice. The weak in Habermas’ 
theory is that we necessarily have to orient the discussion on a rational con-
sent that seems to be an idealization. To avoid idealizations we have better to 
look at what Fulvio Cerutti calls “global challenges” namely nuclear weapons 
and anthropogenic climate change. Global challenges are those that bring 
about the end of modernity and raise the problem of survival. It is not a mat-
ter of individual problems such as poverty terrorism, human rights or interna-
tional justice. The problem of global challenges involves into two problems, 
one moral and the other political. The moral problem concerns future genera-
tions and implies a “transcultural” argument. Cerutti shows the limits of the 
Rawlsian approach and looks at the normative implications of bearing and 
raising children in the transgenerational chain as an experience that we can se-
riously do in the actual moment. The three patterns that work in any caring 
parent or member of a human community are the trust you inspire in your 
children or the children you re caring for; then the vulnerability you see in 
those weaker beings and, as necessary consequence of the these, the responsi-
bility toward future generations. The political problem aims to overcome Hob-
besian strategies that are “abstract” namely seem not to see the wealth that 
irreducible plurality of mentality and custom can represent for all partners to 
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a new necessary worldwide governance. Respect for differences is the topic of 
the conclusive contribution. Leoluca Orlando introduces the important thesis 
that we cannot find a foundation for human rights without to consider iden-
tity. He speaks also as a politician with a significant experience in the field 
and focuses on the problem of an underestimation of the identitarian dimen-
sion. It is not a matter of considering the positive bond of individual to com-
munity, rather we often discover that the most relevant attacks to our secu-
rity come from identity based criminals (as he calls them). 
As Riccardo Dottori points out in the Introduction, the debate about a 
“purity” of reasons is an ancient question that goes back to Plato and Prota-
goras. Autonomy of reason is the core of the contrast between Kant and 
Hegel, but nowadays it cannot be solved in purely philosophical terms. Phi-
losophy in its different areas ought to consider important results of natural 
and social sciences; the contemporary “challenge” for philosophy, that, in 
Habermas’ terms, cannot assign to sciences their place but can only translate 
scientific results into its own language, is thus to formulate its vocabulary also 
in the dialogue with other disciplines.   
 
 
  
